neuroleptic administration, treatment can often come at a considerable cost in view of side effects, particularly neurological symptoms under first-generation neuroleptic agents, and metabolic symptoms, such as weight gain and diabetes under some second-generation agents (Haddad & Sharma, 2007; Rurnmel-Kluge et al., 2010) . In addition to side effects, poor therapeutic alliance, lack of insight (Bora, Sehitoglu, Aslier, Atabay, & Veznedaroglu, 2007; Buchy, Malia, Joober, & Lepage, 2009) , and memory problems ) are reasons why up to three-quarters of patients withdraw medication after hospital discharge (Byerly, Nakonezny, & Lescouflair, 2007; Lieberman et al., 2005) .
The complacency that followed the introduction of atypical neuroleptics has led to a sober reassessment of the benefits and risks o:f neuroleptic treatment. The initial enthusiasm about the benefits of atypical drugs has markedly diminished in recent years {Davis, Chen, & Glick, 2003; Lehrer, 2010) . In addition, the role of psychotherapy is being reconsidered, and psychological models and treatment approaches now face less skepticism. An extensive line of research has put forward evidence for contributions of neuropsychological deficits (Schretlen et al., 200i and, more recently, cognitive biases (Bell, Halligan, & Ellis, 2006; Freeman, 2007 in the pathogenesis of psychosis. Results from basic research are increasing!\" translated into treatment programs (Roder & Medalia, 2010) . So far, the most effective psychological treatment of psychosis appears to be cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT), which exerts a small to medium effect size as an add-on treatment to neuroleptics (Wykes, Steel, Everitt, & Tarrier, 2008) , although-as in other psy chological disorders-dissemination is scarce (Shafran et al., 2009 ).
Psychopharmacology and psychotherapy should be seen as complementary rather than as rivals or counterexclusive interventions. For example, psychophar macology is oft en a prerequisite for psychotherapy in order to mute agitation, formal thought disorder, and hostility, which may undermine or even preclude a therapeutic relationship. Psychotherapy, in turn, improves the person' s under standing of his or her symptoms and thereby often ameliorates medication adherence. Tentative evidence suggests that the routes of action are very dif f er ent (Birchwood & Trower, 2006; Moritz et al., 2009) ; neuroleptics provide some detachment and emotional numbing but do not alter belief conviction (Mizrah et al., 2006) , whereas psychotherapy can enhance illness insight and decreases stress.
METACOGNITIVE TRAINING FOR SCHIZOPHRENIA: OVERVIEW
Metacognitive training (MCT; from metacognition, "thinking about one's think ing") is a novel approach founded in the tradition of psychoeducation, cognitive remediation, social cognition training and CBT. It is now in its fourth edition, and has been translated into 29 languages. MCT targets cognitive biases putatively involved in delusion formation, for which patients often lack adequate awareness (see next section). Another explicit aim of MCT is to foster improved social cog nition and theory of mind (ToM; for an overview see Moritz, Vitzthum, Randjbar, Veckenstedt, & Woodward, 2010; Moritz & Woodward, 2007b) . The training is highly structured, as we endeavored to keep preparation time short and thus facil itate its dissemination. Depending on the group's level of understanding, the text should be read or paraphrased. A friendly and humorous atmosphere should be created, and the exercises should be delivered in an entertaining, interactive, and playful fashion. The present program can be downloaded free of charge via the following link: www.uke.de/mkt. Table 15 .1 summarizes the eight modules of the MCT along with target domains and learning aims.
The main objective of the MCT program is to raise the patienfs awareness of cog nitive biases (e.g., jumping to conclusions) and to prompt him or her to critically reflect on, complement, and alter his or her current repertoire of problem -solving and thinking skills. Longitudinal studies (Klosterkotter, 1992) assert that psycho sis is not a sudden and inevitable event but is often preceded by a gradual change in the evaluation of one's cognitions and (social) environment over several weeks.
The route into psychotic breakdown is thus not necessarily a one-way street, but is a potentially reversible process . Empowering metacognitive competency by rais ing awareness for cognitive biases may then act prophylactically against psychotic breakdown.
The training is delivered by a health care professional in a group of3-10 schizo phrenia spectrum patients. Although trainers should preferably be psychologists 
conveyed to help patients transform negative self-schemata and elevate their mood . These questions are intended to prompt participants to master critical situa tions and to avoid hasty and consequential decisions. On the red card, the patient is encouraged to write down names and telephone numbers of persons and/or institutions that may help in case of crisis or breakdown.
The exercises demonstrate how cognitive biases-which are almost normal, benign, and sometimes even functional when presenting in a subtle degree (decisiveness as the bright side of jumping to conclusions; perseverance as the bright side of incorrigibility; self-certainty as the bright side of overconfidence in errors)-as well as problems with social cognition can escalate into troublesome situations. It is assumed that these biases may separately or in combination culmi nate in the formation of beliefs that may eventually become delusions (Bentall et al., 2009; Moritz, Veckenstedt, Hottenrott et al., 2010) . In the next section, empiri cal evidence for the presence of problematic thinking styles in schizophrenia is summarized. We also subsequently explain how these are dealt with in the dif ferent modules of the MCT (for a summary, see Table 15 .1). The following biases and problems are at the core of the MCT: attributional style (module 1 ), jump ing to conclusions (JTC; modules 2 and 7), bias against disconfirmatory evidence (BADE; module 3}, social cognition/ToM (modules 4 and 6), overconfidence in memory errors (module 5), and depressive cognitive patterns and low self-esteem (module 8). In the dosing section, several recommendations for administration are provided.
COGNITIVE BIASES IN SCHIZOPHRENIA
A psychological or cognitive understanding of delusion formation has long been obstructed by claims that delusions are not amenable to understanding.
Beginning in the 1980s, however, cognitive research has questioned strong for mulations of this account. Several meaningful cognitive mechanisms have been implicated in the pathogenesis of fixed false beliefs (i.e., delusions). These will be described in the following sections, which will first present the theory and empiri cal evidence and then show how they are dealt with in the MCT.
Attributional Style: Theory
As dynamic theorists like Adler (1914 Adler ( /1929 had already reasoned at the begin ning of the last century, patients with schizophrenia show deviances in attribu tional style, specifically a tendency to blame others for own failure (scapegoating).
In contrast, healthy people are more likely to attribute blame to circumstances and are less prone to monocausal inferences than are patients ( have been ill , harsh neon light, an insult, true concern). Group members are made aware that monocausal inferences are unlikely, and that it can be helpful to gener· ate alternative explanations.
What caused the policeman to stop your car?
What is the main reason for this event?
Your�elf?
Cirtt�mstancu er chance? Jumping to Conclusions and Need for Closure: Theory Dealing wi th Jumping to Conclusions in the MCT (Modules 2 and 7)
Aft er discussing the advantages (e.g., saving time and cognitive effort) and dis· advantages of JTC (e.g., risk to make false decisions) at the start of both module 2 and 7, participants are introduced to drastic historical errors induced by JTC.
Then, "urban legends" are discussed (e.g., that the Ku Klux Klan owns Marlboro).
Arguments for and especially against these beliefs are displayed, exchanged, and evaluated for their plausibility among group members.1
The exercises from the first task set of module 2 are picture fragments that eventually display common objects (e.g., a pig; see Figure 15 .3). At each stage, the plausibility of either self-generated or prespecified response alternatives should� rated. Participants are encouraged to make a decision once they feel entirely sure. and all the material was created in such a way that premature decisions lead to errors, thus providing corrective experiences ("seeing is believing").
An edited example of the second task set is shown in Figure 15 The learning aim is to point out that hasty decisions often reveal only half the tr uth. 
Bias Against Disconfirmatory Evidence (BADE): Theory
Incorrigibility is a hallmark criterion feature of delusions. The strong inflexibil ity seen during delusions (e.g., dismissing arguments proposed by relatives about why the CIA is, in fact, not interested in the patient) extends to nondelusional cor:· tents. For this line of research, the bias against disconfirmatory evidence (BADE paradigm has been employed (Veckenstedt et al., 
Dealing with Bias Against Disconfirmatory Evidence in Schizophrenia in the MCT (Module 3)
At the beginning of module 3, participants are encouraged to discuss the advan· tages and disadvantages of inflexibility. For example, hard-headedness is a com· mon human feature and, in a mild form, can also be functional (e.g., to overcom� obstacles when pursuing one' s goals). Then, historical examples and case sampb are conveyed showing how incorrigibility has led to big problems, to the poin� of disastrous events or delusions (case examples). Following this, an example c-:· the so-called confirmation bias is presented: three (different) types of flowen are displayed (parallel version: fruits). Subjects are asked to deduce the corre· sponding higher level category by proposing items that may also fit that categon (superordinate categories: living beings; parallel version: food). The presentee objects mislead many persons to believe the to-be-identifi ed superordinate cat· egory is flowers. Therefore, most people generate objects that only fit this category. 2) The politician encourages the workers to work harder.
3) The preacher is proclaiming the end of the world.
4) The boss announces that there is no money to Increase salaries, although he lives in luxury. 
Social Cognition: Theory
Perhaps beginning with the pioneer work of Frith and coworkers (Frith, 
Dealing with Social Cognition in the MCT (Modules 4 and 6)
Module 4 is primarily devoted to fi rst-order ToM and emotion recognition.
whereas module 6 primarily deals with second-order ToM, need for closure. Figure 15 .7). 'D1is task set is eas il y solved by most participants as context information is provided (e.g., a smiling woman in a wed din g dress). However, subsequent items do not contain contextual information, thereby commo nly prompting misinterpretations (see Figure 15 .8). Is the boss cold-hearted? Do we need additional information to decide?
Sadness
Fi g ure I 5.9 Cold-hearted boss? The example is taken from module 6 (To empathize ... II). lhe pictures are viewed one after the other (the lower right picture is presented first). In this example. participants sometimes do not understand that the viewer has more information than the boss. Whereas the boss' reaction may seem adequate initially (the woman is obviously late), the other pictures cast some doubt on this. The woman has apparently received a bad message from her doctor and is visibly devastated in the two pictures before. Likely manifestations of crying (especially red eyes, bad make-up) may be visible to the boss, who might therefore have reacted more compassionately even if he was unaware of the doctor's message. Figure created by
until the end, which is unsatisfactory for patients with an enhanced need for closure (i.e., intolerance for ambiguity). For such items, participants should propose what additional information is needed to make a reliable judgment.
Nevertheless, it should be discussed which interpretation is best supported by the available evidence.
Metamemory Problems in Schizophrenia: Theory
Memory problems are ubiquitous in most psychiatric disorders, but are espe cially pronounced in patients with schizophrenia (Aleman, Hijman, de Haan, & Kahn, 1999; Heinrichs & Zakzanis, 1998) . Memory dysfunctions impact nega tively on functional {Green, Kern, & Heaton, 2004) and symptomatic outcome (Moritz et al., 2000) in the disorder. Unlike in the amnestic syndrome, memory deficits in schizophrenia reflect problems with encoding and learning informa tion rather than rapid forgetting (Moritz, Heeren, Andresen, & Krausz, 2001 ).
Patients are not usually aware of their memory problems. In fact, our grour found a zero-correlation betw'een subjective and objective memory impairments (Moritz, Ferahli, & Naber, 2004) .
A new line of literature has turned to metamemory, which is concerned with the subjective appraisal of one' s memory performance, particularly response con fidence and memory vividness rather than memory accuracy. As shown by Danion and others (2005) , the recollections in schizo phrenia patients are often vague and lack detail. Further, our group has repeat edly demonstrated that patients with schizophrenia are overconfi dent in memory errors, while at the same time being underconfi dent in correct responses (for a review, see . This response pattern has now been independently replicated (Bhatt, Premature termination of cognitive search processes and liberal decision criteria may result in a neglect of essential cues that might have indicated the fallibil ity of an incorrect response option, thereby promoting overconfidence in errors.
In contrast, controls adopt more careful and deliberate strategies, expressed as a reluctance to fully endorse a response option when the available evidence is ambiguous. Along the same lines, we assume that healthy control participants exhibit greater confi dence in correct responses relative to patients, as the detection of multiple supportive cues raises response confidence. A recent study identified a general pattern of overconfidence in schizophrenia patients, which, however, was more pronounced for errors (Kircher, Koch, Stottmeister, & Durst, 2007) .
Dealing with Metamemory Problems in the MCT (Module 5)
Module 5 first introduces mnemonic strategies to help the patient recall informa tion, and it provides examples for the fallibility of human memory (e.g., in con trast to popular belief, the line "Play it again, Sam" was never uttered in the movie Casablanca): Healthy subjects also forget, mix up, embellish, or recall memory information falsely. In the main part of the module, complex visual scenes are dis played. Many of the stimuli have been utilized in prior basic research studies on the false memory paradigm (Miller & Gazzaniga, 1998; Roediger & McDermott, 1995) . This material prompts a high frequency of false memories, even in 50%-80% of healthy subjects, as core items that you would expect in the picture are in false memories in most subjects, as strongly suggested items are not displayed (here.
blackboard or backpacks are expected from the context but, in fact, are not shown).
Exercises teach participants to base their judgments on perceptual recollections rather than gist or on logical inferences. When the recollection is vague, confidence should be attenuated.
fact removed. Group members are instructed to study the pictures carefully (ser Figure 15 .10} and to memorize each item as vividly as possible. Each scene is fol lowed by a recognition task asking participants to decide whether an item was displayed or not. Subjects are also asked about their response confidence, and tht> trainer should later ask for perceptual details and for participants to adopt "vivid ness heuristics" (i.e., the recollection of perceptual details is a good proxy that an object has indeed been shown, whereas "pale" recollections often indicate falw memories. Here, response confidence should be attenuated). It is made dear to participants that our memory can play tricks on us, as it is constructive and does not work passively like, for example, a video recorder. Participants should learn to doubt their memories and collect additional information if a vivid recollection is not available.
Mood and Self-Esteem in Schizophrenia
It is now well-established that approximately 50% (Buckley, Miller, Lehrer, & Castle, 2009} of the schizophrenia population (in contrast to accounts by, fOf example, Kraepelin) share affective disturbances. Other studies estimate that t\\ "0 (Moritz, Veckenstedt, Randjbar et al., 2010} to three (Freeman et al., 1998 out of four patients have low self-esteem, which may be one reason (among others'
for the high suicide rate in schizophrenia, which is in the range of 5%-15% (for overviews, see Preston & Hansen, 2005; Siris, 2001) .
Dealing with Low Mood and Self-Esteem in the MGT (Module 8)
In view of the high prevalence of depression and low self-esteem in schiwphrenia, module 8 specifically targets depressive cognitive schemata ( overgeneralization and selective abstraction), unhelpful coping strategies (especially rumination, thought suppression), underlying depression, and low self-esteem (see Figure 15. , Oo thlngA you really enjoy -ideally with others 1•·9· movies, go tD' c.le).
, Workout (at lust 20 minutes) -but no struooellno -of j)OSSible stamina tnlnlno, lor example, • lono walk or Joooing.
, Usten to your favourite music:.
Most of r<>tt had pr-bly tl>ougl'ot al "" eleghont and/or of '10t1'1e't hlna whkh ""' to do wJth an eJes:*l.,.. (e.g. zoo , ut•r•. Aft1ca e�c.)
Thit cfTeCt gr� c�n llrooget' Cf (NlO triM to delfbtr�V IOPPI'<!H Upoettlng thOughts n am I l.,.. r· �c.). ThOSCI tho�llts can then be(;ome so ttrooo 11\M th"V seem Slr•noe or our or one•, cDOtron and problem solving. In brief, metacognition is thinking about our thinking. The aim of the program is to learn more about human cognition, and how we can observe and change it to optimize our problem-solving abilities. At the heart of the program are several thinking styles that may contribute to the formation of odd ideas and psychotic symptoms:· Inclusion Criteria, Problematic Situations,
and Individualized Treatment
Inclusion criteria for the MCT group are very liberaL As a rule of thumb, all schizophrenia spectrum patients can participate who are able to attend and follow other group programs as well (e.g., occupational therapy). In our view, important inclusion criteria are past or current delusional ideas or hallucinations. Patients with primary diagnoses other than schizophrenia, depression with psychotic fea tures, and bipolar disorder with beliefs of grandiosity may also be included.
According to our experience and that of our collaborators, groups may com prise first-episode and chronic patients, in-and outpatients, and male and female patients at the same time. Patients with a short attention span or inap propriate/eccentric behavior, aggression/hostility, and severe formal thought disorder should not take part until symptoms have at least declined somewhat.
Although we have successfully run groups with patients diagnosed with oligo· phrenia, here, a stronger focus on the main exercises and frequent repetition is advisable.
Good feasibility and treatment fidelity are now well-established in both in· and outpatients samples (Favrod et al., 2009; Favrod, Maire, Bardy, Fernier, & Bonsack, 2011; Gaweda, Moritz, & Kokoszka, 2009; Moritz & Woodward, 2007a}. Nevertheless, problematic situations can occur. Here, general treatment guidelines apply. For example, if a group member displays severe psychotic symptoms dur ing sessions, these should neither be supported nor openly challenged. However, if patients are already distanced a bit from their symptoms, such experiences may be picked up with MCT exercises containing delusional themes (e.g., module l, scenario "A friend is talking behind your back"; module 6, scenario in which two men appear to talk about a third man). At the start and at the end of each module, we also raise the questions "Why are we doing this?" and '"What does this have to do with psychosis?" These slides translate knowledge from basic research to patients and provide an opportunity for further reflections on personal experi ences of psychosis; participants are encouraged to talk in a nonjudgmental cli mate about their past and present psychotic experiences. However, an in-depth analysis and exchange about individual delusional ideas is best addressed in the framework of face-to-face sessions, as in CBT. An alternative is individualized Metacognitive Therapy (MCT +),which is available in a German-language version and as a beta version in English and Dutch at www.uke.de/mct_plus. The MCf + is more focused on individual symptoms and combines elements of CBT (dispute of fixed beliefs by means of Socratic dialogue, response prevention, establishment of an illness model) with core features of the MGT. As in the group training, a "back-door approach'' is adopted: Instead of challenging symptoms and delu sional appraisals directly, which may undermine the therapeutic alliance, cogni tive biases are addressed first before the therapy continues to challenge individual biases and delusions. medication alone, we hope that (adjunct) cognitive interventions someday will be the norm rather than the exception in treatment.
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